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 Fed cattle marketing and pricing have changed dra-
matically over the last decade. Grid pricing has increased in 
importance while cash marketing of fed cattle has decreased. 
Numerous strategic alliances have evolved while marketing 
fed cattle without a marketing agreement or part of an alliance 
has declined. These and other changes have created oppor-
tunities for some and frustrations for others. One result has 
been increased interest to seek Congressional intervention 
to resolve potential marketing problems.
 The authors conducted a survey of cattle feeders in four 
southern plains and corn belt states (Texas, Kansas, Nebraska, 
and Iowa) in 2002.1 Two specific objectives were to determine 
marketing and pricing practices of cattle feeders, and to solicit 
feedlot managers’ perceptions regarding various aspects of 
the marketing environment they face and policy proposals. 
This fact sheet summarizes selected aspects of the survey 
results. A complete reporting can be found in Schroeder et al. 
2002a. 
Response Profile 
 Total questionnaires mailed numbered 1,501. Completed 
questionnaires numbered 316, for a 21.1% response rate. 
The number of questionnaires mailed for each primary state, 
along with the response number and response rate was: Texas 
– 150 mailed, 48 returned, 32.4%; Kansas – 131 mailed, 50 
returned, 38.2%; Nebraska – 250 mailed, 66 returned, 26.6%; 
and Iowa – 970 mailed, 152 returned, 15.7%.
 Responses by feedlot size varied by state, since Iowa 
and Nebraska have many more smaller feedlots than do 
Kansas and Texas. For all respondents, the distribution of 
responses by feedlot size was: less than 5,000 head capac-
ity, 53.8%; 5,000-19,999 head, 17.8%; 20,000-49,999 head, 
11.5%; 50,000-99,999 head, 10.5%; and more than 100,000 
head, 6.4%. For some questions, responses were weighted 
by feedlot size to get a weighted average response.
Pricing Practices and Motives
 Feedlot managers were asked to identify how cattle 
marketed from their feedlot were priced in 1996, 2001, and 
what they anticipated in 2006. This was intended to provide 
a profile of recent, current, and future pricing practices so as 
to identify changes or trends over time.
 In 1996, 97% of the respondents used the cash market 
to market at least some fed cattle. By 2006, that percentage 
was expected to decline to 70%. For grid pricing, 23% used 
grid pricing for some fed cattle marketed in 1996 and the 
percentage was expected to increase to 88% by 2006.
 Figure 1 shows the same distinct trend away from pricing 
fed cattle on a live weight, cash market basis to grid pricing 
for the weighted average marketings by respondent feedlots. 
Grid pricing typically consists of a base carcass weight price 
in conjunction with a price grid or matrix of carcass premiums 
and discounts for carcass attributes (see http://posuextra.com 
in the Marketing and Outlook section for information on grid 
pricing). Weighted average marketings priced on a live weight 
basis accounted for 66% in 1996 but fell to 38% in 2001 and 
was expected to decline further, to 22% by 2006. Carcass 
weight pricing, sometimes called in the meat or in the beef 
pricing, declined less dramatically, from 16% in 1996 to an 
expected 11% in 2006. Grid pricing clearly is replacing live 
weight, cash market pricing. Weighted average marketings 
priced on a grid accounted for 16% in 1996, increased to 45% 
in 2001, and was expected to increase again, to 62% by 2006. 
Feedlot managers indicated very little use or expected use of 
fixed price or basis contracts.
 Why have feedlot managers switched pricing methods? 
With live weight and carcass weight pricing, each animal in 
the sale lot receives the same price regardless of quality. With 
grid pricing, each animal is priced individually based on its 
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carcass attributes. Thus, economists would argue grid pricing 
is more accurate. Cattle feeders are paid for the quality of 
fed cattle marketed. This means better quality cattle do not 
subsidize lower quality cattle as is the case with live weight 
or carcass weight pricing.
 Feedlot managers were asked for their level of agree-
ment regarding several possible motives for using grid pricing. 
The three most important reasons were to obtain carcass 
premiums associated with higher quality grade and higher 
yielding animals, to access carcass data from packers on fed 
cattle marketed, and to obtain a higher base price. Notably, 
perhaps, respondent feedlot managers indicated their lowest 
ranking motive to switch to grid pricing was being pressured 
to do so by packers.
 The most common method of determining the base price 
varies with grid pricing. However, feedlot managers confirmed 
the belief that the most common method has been and will 
continue to be a formula price tied to the cash market. This 
occurs in two ways, either tying the base price to a market 
price quote for a particular cash market (such as the Western 
Kansas direct trade) or to tie the base price to the buyer’s plant 
average price for a preceding week. Most economists dislike 
either of these formula pricing methods. A major reason is that 
packers have an incentive to keep cash market prices low for 
two reasons. First, it is in their best interest to pay lower prices 
for fed cattle and reduce procurement costs. Second, it also 
means their formula prices for cattle purchased on a grid will 
be low, again contributing to lower overall procurement costs 
for cattle.
 Other alternatives are available but are not frequently used 
according to cattle feeders. Alternatives include negotiating 
the base price with packers, tying the formula base price to 
a futures market quote, or tying the formula base price to the 
wholesale boxed beef price (Schroeder et al. 2002b). Feed-
lot respondents indicated some small movement to these 
alternatives from 1996 to 2001 with an interest in increasing 
their use by 2006. However, they still expect the weighted 
average percentage of base prices tied to the cash market 
to be 35% in 2006, the same percentage as they reported 
using in 2001.
Marketing Practices and Motives
As with pricing methods, feedlot managers were asked to identify 
how fed cattle were marketed from their feedlot in 1996, 2001, 
and what they anticipated in 2006. This, too, was intended to 
provide a profile of recent, current, and future marketing prac-
tices so as to identify changes or trends over time.
 Just as with pricing methods, there has been a sharp 
change in how fed cattle are marketed. Using marketing 
agreements and contracts, participating in an alliance, or 
being part of a cooperative has increased while marketing 
fed cattle without some type of agreement or contract has 
declined.
 Just 30% of the respondents had used some type of 
marketing agreement either outside of an alliance or in con-
junction with an alliance in 1996. By 2001, that percentage 
increased to 64% and was expected to increase to 74% by 
2006.
 In 1996, marketing fed cattle without some sort of mar-
keting agreement or contract accounted for 78% of weighted 
average marketings by respondent feedlots (Figure 2). That 
percentage dropped to 48% by 2001 and is expected to decline 
to 35% by 2006. Marketing agreements and contracts that 
are not part of an alliance, cooperative, or similar marketing 
program increased from 14% in 1996 to 25% by 2001, and is 
expected to remain at about that level in 2006 (26%). A larger 
increase was reported for alliance or cooperative related 
marketings. Weighted average marketings for this marketing 
method in 1996 were 8%, increasing to 27% by 2001, and 
expected to increase to 39% by 2006. Thus, by 2006, more 
fed cattle are expected to be marketed under some type of 
agreement as part of an alliance or cooperative than without 
any marketing agreement or contract. 
 Two of the three most important reasons for the shift in 
marketing method were the same as for the switch to grid 
pricing. Those are to obtain carcass premiums associated with 
higher quality grading and higher yielding carcasses and to 
access carcass data. This response by feedlot managers is not 
surprising, since most marketing agreements, alliances, and 
cooperatives use grid pricing. The third most important motive 
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Figure 1. Percent of Weighted Average Marketings by Pricing Method.
are ready for market. This motive no doubt relates to feedlot 
manager concerns regarding concentration in meatpacking 
and captive supply use by packers. Again, feedlot managers 
indicated the least important reason for changing marketing 
methods was pressure by packers to enter into an agree-
ment.
Perceptions of the Marketing  
Environment
 Feedlot managers were asked to rate their degree of 
agreement or disagreement on several statements related to 
the market environment in which they find themselves when 
marketing fed cattle. The agreement-to-disagreement scale 
was a 9-point scale with one extreme being strongly disagree 
and the other strongly agree. A rating of 5 indicated an uncer-
tain perception or no opinion. Here, results are reported for 
three categories: those indicating any degree of disagreement 
(slight to strong), those indicating an uncertain perception or 
no opinion, and those indicating any degree of agreement 
(slight to strong).
 The trend toward grid pricing and away from cash market 
trades presents a concern to many. As indicated above, the 
most common formula for determining the base price in grids 
ties the base price to the cash market. Therefore, declining 
cash market trades results in a thinning of the reference market 
for the base price formula. Economic theory does not provide 
a clear indication of how thin a reference market can be for 
it to remain representative. Therefore, we really do not know 
“how thin is thin.”
 Feedlot managers were asked their opinion regarding 
whether or not reduced trading in the cash market would be 
harmful to the industry. Of respondents, 69% agreed that it 
would (Figure 3). The remaining feedlot managers were about 
evenly split between those disagreeing (16%) and those with 
no opinion (15%).
 Many producers and feedlot managers are concerned 
about packer concentration and captive supplies (see http://
www.osuextra.com in the Marketing and Outlook section 
for information on structural changes in cattle feeding and 
meatpacking and on concentration and captive supplies). 
Simply the use of captive supplies reduces the proportion of 
cash market trading, contributing to the thin market problem 
just discussed. The bigger concern, however, is with pack-
ers using captive supplies to leverage their cash market 
bids lower. Research indicates use of captive supplies has 
a negative but relatively small effect on cash market prices. 
When asked, feedlot managers overwhelmingly agreed that 
packers bid lower for cash market cattle when they have cattle 
contracted, one form of captive supplies (Figure 4). Among 
respondents, 86% agreed with the perceived negative effect 
captive supplies have on fed cattle prices. Of the remaining 
managers, 5% had no opinion and 9% disagreed regarding 
the negative or harmful impact.
 Thinning of the cash market becomes less of an issue 
if another means is used to determine the base price in 
grids. Feedlot managers were asked their preferences for 
determining base prices. Respondents indicated negotiated 
base prices were preferred to formula prices (Figure 5). Of 
the respondents, 57% agreed that negotiated prices should 
be how the base price is determined. Another 29% had no 
opinion and the remaining 14% disagreed.
 Among respondents, 77% agreed formula base prices 
should be tied to the wholesale boxed beef or retail market 
(Figure 5). This alternative is preferred by many economists 
if the base price is going to be determined by formula, rather 
than tying the base price to the cash market. Packers have a 
natural incentive to push wholesale prices as high as possible, 
since that is a key factor in their sales revenue. Of remaining 
respondents, 17% had no opinion and 6% disagreed. 
Perceptions of Policy Proposals  
and Potential Solutions
 As with perceptions of the marketing environment, feedlot 
managers were asked to rate their degree of agreement or 
disagreement on several potential or recently enacted policies. 
The agreement-to-disagreement scale here, too, was a 9-point 
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scale with one extreme being strongly disagree and the other 
strongly agree. Results again are reported for three categories: 
those indicating any degree of disagreement (slight to strong), 
those indicating an uncertain or no opinion perception, and 
those indicating any degree of agreement (slight to strong).
 Feedlot managers were asked about two alternatives re-
lated to the high level of concentration in the packing industry 
and in food retailing. Two potential solutions are to break up 
the larger packers and retailers into several smaller ones, or 
to provide incentives to form new, producer-owned packers. 
Breaking up the larger packers and retailers did not receive 
strong support (Figure 6). Responses were almost evenly split 
between those agreeing (33%) that breaking up these firms 
would benefit the industry, those disagreeing (36%) with that 
view, and those with no opinion (30%).
 Organizing more producer-owned packers received much 
stronger support (Figure 6). Of respondents, 59% agreed that 
more producer-owned packers would benefit the industry, 
while 18% disagreed and another 24% had no opinion.
 Proposals to deal with the captive supply issue include 
limiting packer ownership of livestock and limiting contract-
ing between packers and feeders (Purcell and Koontz). If 
contracting is restricted between packers and feeders, should 
it be restricted between packers and retailers? These policy 
alternatives were posed to feedlot managers. Figure 7 shows 
strongest support for limiting ownership and feeding of livestock 
by packers. Of the respondents, 64% agreed with this policy 
alternative. Another 21% disagreed and 14% had no opinion. 
Responses to this question varied more by state where the 
feedlot was located than for other questions. Feedlot manag-
ers in Iowa agreed more strongly with this alternative than 
did respondents from Texas and Kansas. Further analysis 
indicated that feedlot size was the determining factor. Smaller 
feedlots favored a ban on ownership and feeding of livestock 














Figure 3. Will Reduced Trading in the Cash Market be Harmful to the Industry?
Figure 4. Do Captive Supplies Reduce Cash Market Prices?
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 Limiting contracting between packers and feeders had less 
support (Figure 7). Among feedlot managers, 37% agreed that 
packers should not be permitted to contract or form marketing 
agreements with cattle feeders. However, 45% disagreed and 
18% expressed no opinion.
 The support for restricting contracting between packers 
and retailers was even less (Figure 7). Just 23% favored not 
permitting packers from forming contracts and marketing 
agreements with retailers. On this, 52% disagreed and 25% 
had no opinion.
 Because of several expressed concerns surrounding price 
discovery, the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act was passed 
in 1999 and implemented in 2001. That legislation marked a 
significant change in market policy in the livestock industry. 
Typically, the livestock industry had not sought governmental 
or non-market solutions to their actual or perceived marketing 
problems. The mandatory price reporting legislation contains 
a sunset clause, meaning the enabling legislation must be re-
assessed and renewed or the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
reverts to voluntary price reporting. Thus, feedlot managers 
were asked their opinion of the effectiveness of mandatory 
price reporting after having experienced it for nearly a year 
(Purcell and Koontz). The response was clear. Mandatory 
price reporting has not been the boon it was thought to be 
by some. Of respondent feedlot managers, 79% agreed the 
benefits to date were less than expected. Only 7% disagreed 
and another 14% registered no opinion (Figure 8).
 Similarly, 50% disagreed that mandatory price report-
ing was benefiting the industry, while 28% agreed and 22% 
had no opinion. Over 50% of respondents generally agreed 
with several other aspects of mandatory price reporting. 
They indicated mandatory price reporting provided less cash 
market information than with voluntary reporting. Mandatory 
price reporting did not enhance their ability to negotiate cash 
prices with packers, to negotiate base prices and formulas 
with packers, or to negotiate grid premiums and discounts with 
packers. Mandatory price reporting resulted in no improvement 
in the timeliness or frequency of price information for decision 
making. The survey response shows clearly that expectations 
regarding mandatory price reporting were considerably higher 
than the benefits realized. As a result, feedlot managers in-
dicated an increased likelihood of using private information 
sources in lieu of or in addition to mandatory price reports.
Summary and Conclusions
 Feedlot pricing and marketing practices have changed 
dramatically and will continue changing. Some changes are 
a response to failures and inefficiencies in the marketplace 
and an effort to make improvements. However, regardless 
of the reasons, these changes carry additional implications 
for the beef industry’s future.
 The survey reported on here was intended to document 
changing pricing and marketing practices and to determine 
perceptions of cattle feedlot managers regarding resulting 
market conditions, alternative marketing policies, and a ret-
rospective view of one recent market policy change. While 
insightful for what was revealed, results forewarn of rocky times 
ahead. The trends toward grid pricing, formula pricing to the 
cash market, and increased use of marketing agreements, 
including those in conjunction with alliances and cooperatives, 
also contribute toward conditions that many respondents 
deem undesirable. These include captive supplies and thin 
markets, among others. Thus, there will continue to be pres-
sure for non-market, governmental solutions. As the response 
regarding packer ownership of livestock indicated, these may 
cause sharp divisions in the industry based on size, location, 
or type of livestock enterprise. Some governmental interven-
tion may be necessary, but as this survey indicated, not all 
government mandates will necessarily improve the situations 
they were expected to correct. Thus, each policy alternative 
must be assessed independently on its own merit.
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